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PROCEEDINGS

OF THE

EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING

OF THE

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

HELD AT

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

DECEMBER 29, 30, 31, 1908.

TOGETHER WITH

THE ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT: THE PROBLEM OF BEAUTY

BY

PROFESSOR HUGO MÜNSTERBERG

[Reprinted from the PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, March, 1909.]

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION: THE EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, DECEMBER 29–31, 1908.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY.

THE eighth annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association was held at Baltimore, Md., in the Johns Hopkins University, on December 29, 30, and 31, 1908, in affiliation with the American Association for the Advancement of Science. The following report of the Treasurer for the year ending December 31, 1908, was read and accepted:

FRANK THILLY, SECRETARY AND TREASURER, IN ACCOUNT WITH THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION.

Receipts.

Balance on hand December 31, 1907	$261.17
Received from dues and sale of Proceedings	194.00
Interest	9.80
	$464.97

Expenses.

Proceedings of Association for 1907	$ 18.65
Cornell Smoker	17.75
Stationery and Printing	30.93
Stamps	19.72
Clerical Aid and Stenographer	17.35
Telegrams	2.60
	$107.00
Balance on hand, December 31, 1908.	357.97
Total	$464.97

The following officers were elected for the ensuing year: *President*, Professor John Grier Hibben, of Princeton University; *Vice-President*, Professor James H. Tufts, of the University of Chicago; *Secretary-Treasurer*, Professor Frank Thilly, of Cornell University; *Members of the Executive Committee* (for two years),

Professor Charles M. Bakewell, of Yale University, and Professor F. J. E. Woodbridge, of Columbia University.

Upon recommendation of the Executive Committee four new members were elected: Dr. G. W. Cunningham, of Middlebury College; Professor Bruce R. Payne, of the University of Virginia; Professor James B. Pratt, of Williams College; and Professor Norman Wilde, of the University of Minnesota.

It was voted that the place of the next meeting be selected by the Executive Committee, the Association expressing its preference for New Haven.

Professor Gardiner, Chairman of the Committee appointed at the last meeting to consider the advisability of appropriating funds for the publication of works of early American philosophers, submitted a report, the following recommendations of which were adopted after discussion and amendment: (1) That we coöperate with Columbia University, the University being willing, to get Johnson's "Elements of Philosophy" published under the auspices of the Association; (2) that a Committee be appointed whose function it shall be to encourage similar publications by the various institutions concerned, the Committee being empowered to authorize the use of the name of the Association in the publication of such works of American philosophers as it may deem suitable; (3) that this Committee undertake the preparation of a complete bibliography of (early) American philosophy; (4) that the sum of $75 be appropriated for the use of the Committee in the preparation of this bibliography and in the work of inciting further publications. The present Committee, consisting of Professors Gardiner, Royce, and Riley, was chosen to carry out these recommendations and authorized to increase the number of its members.

The following resolutions, offered by Professor Hibben, were adopted:

Resolved, That the American Philosophical Association appoint a Committee of five members to act in conference with similar Committees of other learned bodies in preparing and presenting to the Carnegie Institution in Washington a memorial asking that properly approved projects of historical, archæolog-

ical, philosophical, linguistic, literary, and artistic investigation and publication be admitted, in the apportioning of grants, to a recognition similar to that given approved projects of research in the physical and natural sciences.

Resolved, That the Committee be authorized to take such other steps as may seem advisable to further this end.

President Münsterberg appointed as members of this Committee: Professor Hibben, Professor Baldwin, President Butler, Professor Creighton, and Professor James.

Upon motion of Professor Baldwin it was resolved that this Association urgently request the Committee on Ways and Means, or other body having the matter in charge, that the present duty on scientific books printed in English be removed.

Upon motion of Professor Royce the President was requested to appoint a Committee to consider the feasibility of the Plan for a Comparative Lexicon, suggested by Dr. Husik. President Münsterberg appointed Professors Royce, Gardiner, Newbold, Husik, and Hammond as members of this Committee.

It was voted to tender the thanks of the Association to Johns Hopkins University for its hospitality.

The following are abstracts of papers read at the meeting:

The Problem of Beauty. HUGO MÜNSTERBERG.

[The President's Address, which appears in this number (March, 1909) of the PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.]

Concerning a Philosophical Platform. KARL SCHMIDT.

Philosophy may be considered from the point of view of evolution; but this flux, to be made intelligible, must be broken up into *definite stages* from which and toward which the evolution proceeds. Whilst this conception of definite stages is, though necessary, purely auxiliary, if evolution is the controlling idea, it is the predominating one if any *action* is required; and my thesis is that philosophy *is* called upon to act, which I show in typical instances, and that from this demand flows the necessity for philosophy to take a definite form, which must be comparatively invariant. But a definite form of philosophy as such, not of individual convictions, means a recognized doctrine and school. The

second part of the paper makes suggestions of what could be done to realize such a condition in philosophy.

The Postulates of a Self-critical Epistemology. E. G. SPAULDING.

[This paper will be published in full in an early number of the PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.]

A Substitute for Mill's Methods in an Introductory Course. FRANCES H. ROUSMANIERE.

The fact that no datum has any meaning whatever except on the assumption that we know how to describe it correctly, is fundamental for inductive logic. In scientific work this assumption rests on theories as to the proper tests (for instance, for purity of substances and accuracy of measurements), and upon the principles already believed to hold in the field investigated. Thus all induction is virtually deduction, our earliest uncriticised generalizations being no true induction, but the expression of a habit of expectation. A second fundamental consideration is, that an especial kind of presupposition underlies any generalization consciously made on the basis of particular experience, — a presupposition as to the degree to which any example of a field is representative of the field as a whole, that is, as to the relative uniformity of the field. The study of Mill's methods crowds out, through lack of time, these more important questions, and classifications of scientific method based on these may well be substituted for the canons in an elementary course in logic.

A classification on the basis of the interrelation of theory and data will, among other things, bring out the difference between the described, and so already generalized and lifeless, experiment of the text-books and the experiment for the investigator as we find it in biographies and reports. A classification of scientific methods will show that a carefully selected group of representatives is chosen where the field has different kinds within it, a group of examples taken as they may come where there is believed to be some chance that a few individuals are eccentric; that averages, means, etc., are artificially constructed representatives; and that imperfections of technique complicate the question of the amount that must be tested in a given field.

Knowledge of Persons and Religious Faith. C. H. HAYES.

Knowledge dealing with things, forces, and natural laws is alone definitely considered in logic; but we have also, as a matter of every-day experience, knowledge of men and women, which we use effectively and find of vital interest. The method of this knowledge of persons appears to be a delicate induction, which forms reliable conclusions from comparatively few, but significant, data.

The hypothesis made by religious faith is that it knows a personal God. Criticisms upon this commonly assume that all knowledge must conform to the canons of natural science, and that we cannot work up from scientific generalizations to the idea of an absolutely supreme Being. As, however, religion seeks, not Energy, Motion, or Law, but God, possessing infinitely higher and more definite reason, will, and love than human persons possess, it may be possible to know him in ways like those in which we know persons, by an induction even more delicate than that by which we know men. And this is what religion supposes it does. Thus Christian faith makes a great hypothesis, which it finds verified in part by observation of nature and of man's reason and conscience, more fully by the experiment of living according to it, and completely by God's revelation of himself in the history of the Hebrew people and in the appearing of Jesus Christ. This revelation is given through divine acts, comparatively few in number, but significant of God's presence and nature.

This view makes faith not radically unlike science, though clearly distinguished from it by the difference in the objects of the two; and it respects religion's own account of itself, that it is the knowledge as well as the love of God. Thorough study of our knowledge of persons would give a proper basis for criticising the possibility of religious knowledge, and would in itself make clearer an actually existing realm of mental activity which as yet lies outside our accepted psychology and logic.

Naturalistic and Theoretic Thinking. E. S. STEELE.

Science, beginning with naturalistic data, endeavors not to annul but to explain them. The relation between the naïve apprehen-

sion and the explanation is similar to that between thought in figurative clothing and plain thought. This again is paralleled in some wise by thought distinguished as sensuous and as pure. All thought, however, is sensuous to the extent that it requires sensuous embodiment. Sense matter as clothing of pure thought may be called *intrinsic* embodiment, since its office is embodiment and nothing more. Figurative representation, on the other hand, is *extrinsic* embodiment, or symbol, since it must have a primary meaning before it can be a symbol. It is alone through symbols that non-extended objects are conceived.

The naturalistic thinker accepts the world in its every-day sensuous dress; the theorist endeavors to separate the truth from its guises. The distinction between the classes, however, is only relative, since theoretic thinking is at first very crude. The imperfection of theory, moreover, is shown by its frequent disagreements. These arise from the fact that in seeking new and more interior symbols different minds choose differently. Theorists are of two classes, the scientific and the speculative. In true scientific thinking the embodiment is held in strict subjection to the fact; in speculative thinking, the subject-matter is accommodated to a conception form which may be called a *schema*. The most imposing systems are apt to have for a schema some aspect of the logical function, as in Spinoza and Hegel; an example of a different kind is afforded by the "will and idea" of Schopenhauer. All speculative systems are essentially symbolic creations, vast figures of speech. They have no scientific value, but like other symbols may serve as vehicles of truth. The only philosophy which has a scientific value is a critical dogmatism; dogmatism, because it holds fast to the great self-sufficing insights; critical, because, on the one hand, it clears away naturalistic crudities, and, on the other, keeps free from schematic perversions.

Paradoxes in Realistic Epistemology. BERNARD C. EWER.

A paradox, philosophically speaking, is an apparent self-contradiction which, if genuine, would disqualify the theory containing it. Dualistic realism contains paradoxes which are regarded by many as destructive of consistency. In particular there are two which may be called the spatial and temporal paradoxes.

The former is the puzzle, how 'what is evidently one reality should be in two places at once, both in outer space and in a person's mind.' The latter is the 'lateness' of perception, due to the fact that the physical and physiological processes involved occupy a certain length of time. These paradoxes are not sustained by reflection as permanent theoretic inconsistencies. In the case of the first, when we state the facts of perception with precision we do not say or imply that the same object is found 'in two places at once.' The distinctions made by dualistic realism between objective consciousness and real object are not self-contradictory. The second difficulty, *i. e.*, the alleged inconsistency between the apparent presence and the real pastness of the object as perceived, disappears if we recognize that perception, as a cognitive fact, does not imply the strict temporal presentness of the object. The pragmatic presence of the latter in perception is quite compatible with its temporal pastness; there is no contradiction in saying that we perceive the object as it was. In brief, the account of perception given by dualistic realism contains, with reference to spatial or temporal characteristics, no theoretic inconsistency.

The Present Meaning of Idealism. ERNEST ALBEE.

It seems fair to assume that neither materialism proper nor subjective idealism is an adequate philosophical theory, — the former, because it explains the relatively known in terms of an unknowable; the latter, because it gives no adequate account o objective reality. After the first too rapid success of Hegelianism in Germany and the thorough-going reaction which followed, the 'back to Kant' movement in its various forms tended to stereotype certain Kantian conceptions which were far from expressing the real logic of the idealistic position. These should be carefully examined before one presses the claims of idealism against those of realism. The Kantian conception of the *a priori* involves the difficulties of the older rationalism and, to a certain extent, those of subjective idealism. The progressive philosopher to-day, like the scientist, is looking, not for principles 'independent of all experience,' but rather for principles that will express adequately the various forms of interdependence within experience. The

categories of thought are always in the making, and their evolution is always determined by teleological considerations. Nothing in experience can be 'merely given,' and as little can the form of experience be supplied by the mind. What is 'given' is nothing less than experience itself as a living process, which must be treated as organic. If we rule out things-in-themselves as meaningless, since by hypothesis they are unknowable, and recognize that subject and object have no meaning apart from their functional relation to each other, what right have we to assume that space and time are merely phenomenal? They are forms, not merely of our intuition, but of concrete experience itself, objectively regarded, and therefore forms of the only reality with which we have to deal. This, naturally, is not to say that the mere space-time aspect of things exhausts the character of even physical reality, — for science, like philosophy, presupposes a permanent system of relations, — but it should be recognized that the technical abstractions of certain philosophical disciplines prove the unreality of space and (particularly) of time as little as do the instrumental abstractions of various other sciences.

The Notion of the Implicit in Logic. J. E. CREIGHTON.

This paper is primarily a discussion of Baldwin's canons of Actuality and Continuity as stated in the first volume of *Thought and Things*. It is maintained that the criterion of reality set up by the first canon,— actual presence,— cannot be literally applied to a developing logical series, which is a progression of functions and meanings, and not one of existences. Moreover, Continuity cannot mean mere psychical or temporal continuousness, but must be based on some kind of identity between the earlier and later,— *i. e.*, some form of the implicit. This can be made intelligible only when the development of knowledge is regarded teleologically, as a system of functions through which the rational ends which constitute the mind are progressively realized. Baldwin's discussions of the nature of a genetic series fail to bring out its teleological character as the essential mark which distinguishes it from a mechanical sequence of events.

The Field of Propositions that have Full Factual Warrant. WALTER T. MARVIN.

This paper is a continuation of a paper read before the Association at the Cornell meeting.

The field of propositions that have full factual warrant, is bounded negatively by excluding from it all postulates or axioms, all causal and existential propositions, and any proposition that is an inference from these. The field itself may be affirmatively described by answering three questions: (1) What relations are asserted in factual propositions? (2) How far is generalization possible in them? (3) What place do these propositions occupy in the system of science?

(1) The relations asserted are of four types: (*a*) Likeness and Difference; (*b*) Various relations between a whole and its parts; (*c*) Relations of order and of magnitude; (*d*) The presence or absence of a term in the factual field. (2) Generalization is possible. The highest are intensive not extensive generalizations. But they are all lower generalizations than the propositions used in the foundations of logic and mathematics. (3) The purely descriptive parts of science come nearest to lying wholly in the field. The theories of value come next. In relation to mathematics and the pure causal sciences the work of these factual propositions is two-fold: (*a*) They form the logical bridge between non-existential, or pure science, and existential, or applied science; (*b*) They suggest, but do not give to science her vast array of premises, and by continually doing so, as science progresses, they keep pure science consistent wtih numberless factual propositions. That is, they do not give us premises from which causal propositions can be inferred or deduced. They are simply standards with which causal assumptions must be kept consistent.

Analysis of Simple Apprehension. W. H. SHELDON.

We examine cases of presentation with objective reference: *e. g.*, hear a noise in the margin of consciousness, which we cognize yet do not think *about*. Such simple cases are real facts, not abstractions. They are mostly marginal; for we generally think *about* what is focal. The problem is to analyze such cases,

to see what light they throw on cognition. The genetic study is omitted here. These cases contain: (1) Some content and its discrimination. This discrimination does not always involve another content from which the first is distinguished. Sometimes a content stands out against a background or margin, while yet we are not aware of that margin at all. The minimum subject-matter of apprehension is content + relation. (2) A disposition to believe against doubt or suggested disbelief. (3) A liability to error (for the content, while for itself indubitable fact, may be falsely discriminated) which justifies us in calling simple apprehension a primitive kind of judgment. (4) An adaptation between the structure of the subject-matter and the belief-side, such that only a content in relation *can* be believed, and all contents in relation *are* believed unless inhibited by other beliefs. There is no subject-predicate relation here: Brentano's theory and the predication-theory both fail to apply to these primitive judgments. The sufficient definition of the simplest cognition then is: a content in relation, plus a disposition to believe.

The Concept of Substance and the Problem of Matter. J. A. LEIGHTON. (Read by title.)

An Outline of Cosmic Humanism. FRANK C. DOAN.

What sort of world-view is pragmatism likely to breed, if allowed to produce its truths on a cosmic scale? What is the meaning of men's inveterate search for the eternal and universal? The present paper intends to examine merely the roots of this pragmatic tree of knowledge. It is certain that the eternal is not of the nature of *ideas* nor of *forms*. The infinitudes of the pure reason, as well as the infinitudes of the practical, are wanting in any ideational or formal content that would distinguish them one from another. 'Infinite' when attached to a substantive is the sign of a contentless, formless *function* of experience. There is no such *thing* as an infinite *idea*. In its roots the cosmic life consists in the instinctive coördination of blind impulses into an organism of experience, a fructification of unconscious will-impulses into organic life. The physical universe is now felt in the cosmic life as so much pull and haul and dead weight.

Meanwhile the humanist metaphysic need not postulate a cosmic experience *less* plastic than the human. Within uncertain limits physical processes are subject to control from higher, motor centers of the organism. There is in *human* organisms no inherent disability which would prevent the controlling of physical processes from volitional centers in the *cosmic* life.

It is conceivable that the function of consciousness even on a cosmic scale should cease to operate. The existence of the universal is in no active sense necessary. In 'absolute' idiocy and in coma the organism of experience seems to be slipping back into the abyss of totally blind impulses-to-be in which the cosmic life has its roots. The persistency of the physical universe in the midst of its ceaseless flux of being must be interpreted partly as the natural healthiness of a great cosmic animal, and partly as the conscious resistance of cosmic energy to the deranging forces of disease and fatigue.

This root or marrow of divinity should not be confused with the divine *character* which men connote by their more tender terms of infinitude. What this character is, how far conscious and how far subconscious, in what degree personal and in what trans-personal, God only knows. Humanism can only urge over-beliefs at this point.

The True, the Good, and the Beautiful, from a Pragmatic Standpoint. W. P. MONTAGUE.

The 'pragmatic standpoint' is here taken to mean the attempt to interpret all forms of mental activity in terms of the process of adaptation of an organism to its environment. From this standpoint the logical, ethical, and æsthetical types of *value* should appear as differing forms of that vital *equilibrium* between organism and environment, the attainment of which is the goal of all processes of adaptation. This vital equilibrium may result: (1) from the organism conforming itself to the environment; (2) from the environment being made to conform to the needs of the organism; (3) from an unforced or spontaneous accord of each with the other. The paper suggests: (1) that the true, the good, and the beautiful may each be identified with one of these types of equilibrium; (2) that they are radically distinct from one

another; (3) that therefore the pragmatic method yields a conclusion at variance with that pragmatic doctrine which treats the true as a form of the good.

Absolutism and Teleology. A. W. MOORE.

The pass-word of the philosophical camp would seem at first glance to be 'purpose.' But a second look shows that the term covers wide differences. Indeed, the issue here is the same as elsewhere; viz., the issue between completionism, — absolute perfectionism, — and evolutionism, which in the opinion of the paper is the fundamental point of the 'pragmatic' movement. In metaphysics, it is the question of whether there are forms or laws of change which themselves are unchangeable; in logic, whether, as Hegel asked, there is a real evolution of the categories; in biology, whether there can be a development of function with no corresponding development of structure, or conversely; in ethics, whether the ideal is all-inclusive, fixed, and given, or constructed in the process in which it functions.

As the logical and metaphysical aspects of the problem have held the center of the stage thus far, the paper passes to the ethical phases of the issue where the conception of the all-inclusive, fixed ideal is supposed to find its strongest support. "If the absolute purpose finds no place in science, this only shows," says the absolutist, "the abstract, mechanical character of science." It is to be noted in passing, however, that, since Darwin, science has become steadily more and more teleological. This, the evolutionist maintains, is because Darwin in science, as Hegel in logic, made possible the conception of an evolutional teleology. The mechanical character of pre-Darwinian science was but the counterpart of the absolute type of teleology which then prevailed.

The ethical support for the conception of the all-inclusive, fixed ideal, is found by the absolutist in its supposed necessity, as: (1) the standard of moral progress; (2) the basis of objectivity necessary to moral responsibility and authority.

To (1) the evolutionist says: (a) that, since the content of this absolute ideal can be known to no finite being, it cannot serve as a standard; (b) its all-inclusive character leaves no room for either progress or regress.

To (2) he replies: (a) that, aside from the psychological question of how an all-inclusive purpose can be selective, and the logical problem of the relevancy of a ready-made ideal, moral *responsibility* requires that the agent participate in the construction of the ideal which he is to help execute; (b) that objectivity is provided for in the fact that the whole process is social through and through.

With the precise limits or constituents of this social process the evolutionist's principle is not concerned. The process may include infra- and super-human agencies. The principle demands only that this social process be real and that reality be this social process.

The Import of Pragmatism for the History of Philosophy. J. G. HUME.

Pragmatism, controversially, is opposed to Intellectualism. Psychologically, it asserts the primariness of the vivid sensational or emotional experiences of the present moment, contrasting them with the theoretical constructions regarded as less real. Logically, it endeavors to reduce the ratiocinative process of mediation to successive immediate emotional responses, and defines truth in terms of satisfactoriness of this emotional reaction. Ethically, it uses the same method to get results and applies the same test for their validity. Will is the effort to secure satisfying emotional adaptations, Belief is the anticipation guiding such adaptive effort, Goodness is the successful adaptation. Attacks on Pragmatism follow these lines: defence of Intellectualism; denial of the accuracy of the pragmatic psychological assertions; disputing the correctness of the logical method and the sufficiency of the epistemological content; doubting the adequacy of the method and test, and the validity of conclusions, in moral and religious 'belief.' Pragmatism is a continuation and extension of Empiricism. It attacks Plato, defends the Sophists, reinstates David Hume, adds to Hume's "customary conjunction," the Darwinian doctrine of heredity, and accepts evolutionary utilitarianism.

Earlier Empiricism rejected both intellect and will, Pragmatism rejects intellect but asserts the will. Schopenhauer also

denies intellect and affirms will, but his will is transcendent-cosmic, the pragmatic will is empirical-humanistic.

Pragmatism, in separating the will both from the physical motor and the intellectual motive, approaches abstract mediæval 'liberty of indifference.' Modern intellectualists, affirming both intellect and will, give a more concrete account of will than the pragmatists, *e. g.*, T. H. Green's account of motive and unification of desire, intellect, and will. [Hegel, attacking the mere understanding, asserts concrete synthetic reason.] The materialistic-mechanical attack on Pragmatism has no pertinence, since the mechanical standpoint provides no basis for any distinction between good and evil, true and false, fact and fancy. The real controversy is between objective and subjective idealism, and the central issue is the will. Though pragmatism ostensibly defends empirical subjective idealism and attacks objective idealism, it is really reconstructing empiricism so as to approach more closely to objective idealism.

A Plan for a Comparative Lexicon of Philosophical Terms in Greek, Syriac, Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin, Historically Treated. ISAAC HUSIK.

The study of mediæval philosophy has long been difficult for want of (1) good editions of texts, and (2) adequate external help in terminology of the mediæval writers. The first want is gradually being remedied by publications such as those of Baümker's *Beiträge*. As long as the second defect remains, students, translators, and editors of mediæval works, particularly of Oriental works, in Hebrew and Arabic, will find their task difficult.

As all medieval philosophy is based upon the Greek writings, especially of Aristotle, which were translated first into Syriac, from this into Arabic, and from Arabic into Hebrew and Latin, or from Arabic into Hebrew, and from this into Latin, it is proposed to gather the terminology of these translations and other works based upon them into a lexicon, paying special attention to their historical development. Such a lexicon would not only enable the student, translator, and editor of a philosophical mediæval text to understand his author, and expound, translate, or edit him correctly, but would give us a history of mediæval phi-

losophy in schematic form, by enabling us to determine, (1) the genuineness of works attributed to a given author, (2) his relations to his predecessors and followers, (3) the center of his philosophical activity, (4) the influence of schools of thought upon one another. It would besides contribute important additions to the present Hebrew, Arabic, and Syriac lexicons, and encourage the study of mediæval philosophy.

The undertaking here proposed is a very large one, and beyond the powers of any one man to carry out. Moreover, it requires the moral and material encouragement of institutions and academies here and abroad. Its importance, however, should make it feasible. Dr. Pollak of the University of Prague has been interested in the subject for many years, and assures the author that given the proper support, coöperators will not be wanting. The field would be divided among specialists in their respective lines, who would prepare monographs in selected portions of the field to be covered. When these monographs have been got together they may then be combined into a historical lexicon of the philosophical terminology of the Middle Ages, thus filling a very sensible gap in the *Culturgeschichte* of Europe.

Reflections on Kant's First Antinomy. E. A. Singer, Jr.

The Problem: Only observation can determine the spread of bodies in space, their duration in time; and there is no finite series of observations that can decide between a finite and an infinite distribution or history. We seem to be presented with an *unknowable fact.*

But is each of these experimental series bound to be infinite? Can we not conceive of a law of force that would reflect distribution throughout an infinitive region in the behavior of bodies contained in a finite? At least, we may answer, no known law will do this, — the complete discussion presents insuperable difficulties. But can we not at least assume that the history of the system of nature is completely given in its behavior? If so, we could not distinguish between a behavior that meant an infinite past and one (shown to be definable) which would mean a finite, so long as a probable error of experiment remained. But to reduce this probable error to zero itself involves an infinite series of observations.

The problem is more general than Kant supposed. The discussion shows that not only the fact of the world's limits in space and time, but that any question of fact involves an infinite series. Yet Kant's solution of the particular case is a solution of the general. *Das Unbedingte*, become the bare datum of experience, is found not to be given *in* experience, but given *to* experience as a problem. It is never experienced, but stands for an *ideal* of empirical method. *The Ding-an-sich as ideal*, this is one way of expressing the outcome of the Dialektik, an idealism of the *a posteriori*, quite independent of the idealism of the *a priori* presented in the Æsthetik and Analytik.

Kant's Doctrine of the Summum Bonum. M. A. COHEN.

In the first part of this paper an attempt is made to give a sympathetic interpretation of Kant's doctrine by calling attention to its essentially social character. The *summun bonum* is the ideal of a perfectly moral universe or commonwealth, which it is our duty to promote. In this ideal commonwealth happiness is distributed in accordance with the principles of retributive as well as distributive justice. The conception of the deity involved is not necessarily that of a *deus ex machina*. What is essential to the argument is the moral faith in a power adequate to bring nature into harmony with the demands of moral life.

In the second part of the paper several objections to this doctrine are considered: (1) The objection that the union of happiness with duty in the *summum bonum* is inconsistent with Kant's rigorism, is due to a confusion between rigorism and asceticism. In Kant's own words: "The distinction between the principle of happiness and morality is not an opposition between them." (2) The objection of Schleiermacher and others that happiness cannot enter into the *summum bonum*, because the latter is the object of reason while happiness is entirely an affair of our sense nature, is philologically untenable, and misinterprets the relation between sense and reason in Kant's philosophy. Happiness, like morality, is applicable only to a creature who is both rational and sensible. (3) The most important objection to the doctrine is that back of it there is involved a doctrine of rewards and punishments, and this is generally supposed to be inconsistent with the

principle of virtue for virtue's sake. But here again the supposed contradiction follows only from drawing the antithesis too sharply. A sympathetic interpretation of Kant's doctrine, indeed, would enable us to transcend the usual antinomies between conduct and its result, between the end and the means.

The Idea of Justice in the Christian Ethics. J. M. Mecklin.

Unlike the Greek and the modern conception of justice, the Christian idea is essentially otherworldly and transcendental, rather than political or social. The just life is the result of a divine pronouncement upon human life and character, rather than the outcome of man's social and political relations. This was due largely to the centuries of oppression suffered by the Jewish people, which led them to look for justice not in existing conditions, but in a supernatural and catastrophic close of the present world-order when existing moral values would be reversed by a divine judgment and an ideal condition, "the kingdom of God and his righteousness," would be introduced. The large number of passages in the Christian sources of a distinctly eschatological nature show that the author of the Christian Ethics held to this prevailing conception of justice. Hence the very slight reference to questions of political justice, the insistence upon complete self-abnegation, and the emphasis of non-resistance of evil, as essentials in the just and righteous life. Had the author of Christian Ethics contemplated the continued existence, or at most the gradual moral transformation, of the existing political and social orders, it is more than probable that his teachings would have placed more emphasis upon justice as a social and civic virtue.

The Doctrine of Histurgy: an Epistemology for the Scientist and the Logician.[1] Christine Ladd Franklin.

Hitherto, philosophy has consisted of different, irreconcilable — in fact, incompatible — 'systems'; but this state of things is not necessarily permanent. The powers of the human mind have now become so sharpened, — notably by the discipline of the strictly reasoning sciences, logic and mathematics, — that it

[1] This paper was read in abstract before the Philosophical Congress in Heidelberg, August, 1908.

ought to be possible to secure some common, accepted body of doctrine having scientific character. Much of the philosophy of the past has already been shown to be a tissue of fiction and unreason; much of the philosophy of the present can be shown to be of the same character: it needs but a vigorous, concerted effort on the part of philosophers to rescue philosophy from the charge of being art, or poetry, but not science. Moreover, there is at present a greater need for an accepted philosophy among the non-philosophers than there has ever been before. The other sciences, — notably mathematics and logic, — are growing rapidly, not only forwards but also backwards, and as they dig down deeper into their foundations they feel the necessity for an established philosophy, that is, for a discipline which shall explain whatever is capable of being explained but has not yet been explained in any one of the special sciences.

Such a philosophy, I venture to predict, should consist of the following doctrines:

1. A theory of reality, — the theory (already wide-spread among philosophers later than Kant) that immediate, uninterpreted, unanalyzable experience is the type, — and also the entire content, — of what is, in the highest degree, the real, or the existent.

2. A reformed psychology; since philosophy is necessarily based upon what the not-farther-analyzable constituents of consciousness are, it is of the last importance that these constituents should be correctly made out. Not thought, not sensation, not will, is the groundwork of an adequate philosophical system; the fundamental content of consciousness is all that we have to build philosophy upon, but also we need it all.

3. A theory of truth.

4. Since truth is expressed in the form of judgments, a theory of the judgment.

Knowledge, — the *ensemble* of all true and non-trivial propositions, — acquires the immense validity which we attribute to it (over and above what simple isolated inductions would have) by means of the interconnections of truths and the fresh confirmations (through instances) which we are able to obtain of the con-

sequences of several truths when fused together by way of reasoning. Knowledge is a net-work, a woven tissue, a work of weaving.

This and not the pragmatic view is the true doctrine of consequences; it is desirable to give it a name, in order that a doctrine which is simple and well known, but true, may the more readily make front against the vagaries of pragmatism — the name, perhaps, of histurgy (a work of weaving).

Discussion: Realism and Idealism.

JOSIAH ROYCE. (No abstract has been furnished.)

JOHN DEWEY.

The conclusion of the paper was that realism and idealism arise from differences in logical attitude and mode of attack, realism standing for the function and rôle of observation, description, definition and classification, while idealism sets store by the function of reflection, interpretation, reorganization of facts through the projection of ideas and hypotheses. Since, however, these functions are mutually cooperative and limiting in the pursuit of knowledge, the real problem of the realistic-idealistic controversy turns out to be why and how each of these *motifs* is isolated from the other, and thereby exaggerated into the basis of an independently complete system.

The answer is to be sought in historic considerations. The background of ancient thought was custom and habit; a world of fixed characters, the world of natural and social acknowledgments, or observations, corresponds to custom and habit. Thus the logic of observation was entangled with a cosmology which was both false and irrelevant, and the result of classic thought was an ontology which even when idealistic *as a theory of existence* (as in the case of Plato and Aristotle) was realistic as a theory of knowledge.

Under the conditions of the origin of modern thought, the emphasis fell upon progress, and hence upon protest and rebellion against acceptance of the given and customary order, whether that of the senses or of institutions. The individual was magnified, and in the individual the power of projecting ideas, of discovery, of inferring the new and the different. The logical stress

was thus transferred to 'ideas' and interpretation at the expense of 'data' and observation, which were transformed from finalities into fragmentary raw material for thought. Individual consciousness thus took the place of the perceptible cosmos as the clue to the metaphysical characterization of Reality, and epistemological idealism was born.

Present indications are towards giving up the attempt at wholesale characterizations of 'Reality' as such. In this case, the coöperation and mutual limitations of observation and interpretation, of custom and progress, in the pursuit of knowlege will be recognized, and the absolutistic opposition of realism and idealism will become an historic episode.

FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE.

As a contribution to the discussion this paper proposed an examination of the nature of consciousness based upon considerations drawn from the study of the structure and functions of the sense organs and the nervous system. A superficial examination of the sense organs and the nervous system reveals a striking difference in structure and function, which becomes more striking the more thorough the examination is made. Thus the sense organs appear to be constructed and differentiated in relation to qualitative differences in the stimuli which may affect them, while the nervous system appears to be constructed and unified in relation to coördinated activity by the organism. While the sense organs put the organism in diversified contact with its surroundings, the nervous system prevents this diversification from resulting in disintegrated and isolated reactions. It is thus apparent that the nervous system secures to the organism individuality and unity of life in spite of very great diversity of stimuli and of environment. These considerations afford the means of stating the relational view of consciousness in biological terms. An organism so situated that it should be affected by specific qualitative differences in the world about it, but which should, none the less, react in a unified and coördinated manner no matter how it might be stimulated, might well be defined as a conscious organism. Its consciousness would be a relational system supervening upon its differentiated contact with its sur-

roundings. Furthermore, its consciousness would be marked by many of the characteristics usually attributed to consciousness. It would, for instance, be what we call private and personal, and, being unified, it would present features ascribed to a self or a mind. Different organisms could readily be conceived as exhibiting those varieties and even abnormalities of experience with which we are familiar.

C. M. Bakewell.

The first thing necessary in a discussion of realism and idealism is to get rid, once for all, of certain misunderstandings with regard to idealism which are very common even in the current discussions, and which would indeed turn idealism into a form of madness. (1) As to method. It is charged that the idealist rests his case against realism, or in support of idealism, on the physiological argument, and since this argument cannot be stated without taking it for granted that idealism is *not* true, the idealist is in the absurd position of supposing his philosophy to be the conclusion drawn from premises which that conclusion itself makes absurd. (2) As to results. It is charged that the idealist resolves physical phenomena into mental phenomena ; that he is logically forced to believe that the actual processes of nature are identical with his experience and knowledge of those processes ; that, in a word, he entirely obliterates the distinction between the subjective and the objective. These charges are all unsupported by the facts. They constitute a set of absurdities that may be extracted from certain statements of the *esse-percipi* theory, — most unfortunate phrase, — but they cannot even be laid to the door of Berkeley. The realistic theory of matter which Berkeley was opposing presents a parallel absurdity. And just as the modern realists do not attempt to revive this pre-Berkeleyan 'hypothetical' realism, so modern idealisms are equally innocent of early subjectivism, — if, indeed, there ever existed a subjective idealist. It is a significant fact that the first searching criticism of the *esse-percipi* theory was made by the first great idealist. And many of the criticisms he made are identical with those which the modern realist makes when he thinks he is attacking idealism, but is in truth attacking the common enemy, subjec-

tivism. And it is no less significant that the first great realist, Democritus, is the man who more than any other is responsible for the esse-percipi theory of his fellow townsman, Protagoras. The inference which these facts at once suggest is amply justified by the history of philosophy: that a realism which makes the reals lie outside of experience in an inaccessible beyond has subjectivism for its twin error; and that idealism, so far from being identical with subjectivism, is rather an attack upon it, and an attempt to make objectivism intelligible. It should be clear that any criticism of idealism which starts out with the assumption that we have two separate orders called mental phenomena and physical phenomena, and then proceeds to put ideas into the class mental phenomena and summarily rule idealism out of court because it has taken the half of reality for the whole, has no value, since it simply begs the question at issue, idealism being one continued protest against the finality of any such division of realities. If one could make such division it is plain that ideas would not belong exclusively to either group. The common motive underlying the efforts of science and philosophy alike is the desire in and through individual experience to reach universal experience. Every experience being characterized by the dual subject-object relation, there are two paths that idealism follows, one, the ontological, starting from the object side of this relation, and the other, the epistemological, starting from the subject side. In the resulting concrete or objective idealism the word idea is not given, as is charged, a strange and unusual significance, but is employed in one of its most commonly accepted meanings. But it is of course not equivalent to image, impression, state of consciousness, or mental phenomenon.

NORMAN SMITH.

Two points may be contended for. First: a distinction between consciousness and its object, between process of apprehension and object apprehended, is the irreducible minimum which our theory of knowledge must recognize and for the possibility of which it must account. The subjective factors must be stated in specifically subjective terms; otherwise objectivity itself goes by the board. Secondly: the relation of mind and body is

the crucial problem through the treatment of which our theories, and especially those that claim to be realistic, can best be tested by the relevant facts. And it has this importance because it is the problem through which our theory of knowledge connects with the standpoints of physics and physiology.

Objective idealism, which proceeds by emphasizing the logical relation of necessary mutual implication between subject knowing and object known, or between both and an absolute self-consciousness, persistently ignores the problem of the relation of mind and body. The realistic theories seem open to criticism in so far as they seek to explain consciousness in purely objective terms, and consequently treat the problem of the relation of mind and body as if it raised the question only of the adaptation of the physical organism to its environment.

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(Members are requested to notify the Secretary of any correction to be made in the above list.)

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THE PROBLEM OF BEAUTY.[1]

THE masterly presidential address of my predecessor in this office was devoted to "The Problem of Truth." He spoke with authority a unifying word in the struggles which characterize the American Philosophy of to-day. He focused the interest of our Association on the one central point from which our discussions in recent years have been derived, and there certainly can be no higher mission for such presidential addresses than to give expression in this way to that which stands in the foreground of our thoughts. Yet, is it merely the law of psychical contrast which makes me believe that there is one thing not less important than the center of our interests, namely, the center of our neglects? Am I entirely wrong in thinking that if such a presidential address has to accentuate a certain problem, it may be right to work against philosophical one-sidedness by emphasizing not those problems which are daily with us but those which we have forgotten and almost lost? One-sidedness is nowhere more dangerous than in philosophy, for every true philosophical question and answer is related to the whole philosophical universe. To give attention to a fraction only must always lead to a distorted view of reality. In every other field of intellectual effort, the division of labor may demand a one-sided concentration, and perhaps without serious harm. In philosophy there never was, and never can be, a movement which does not pay a grave penalty for the neglect of any fundamental side of life. Truth and morality, beauty and religion give meaning to our life; and the experience which philosophy seeks to interpret and to understand

[1] Delivered as the presidential address before the Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association at Johns Hopkins University, December 30, 1908.

is falsified, if you substitute one single color for the rainbow of reality, if you discuss the question of truth alone.

Surely, I have no right to say that this has occurred wholly. The philosophical problems of morality and religion have been unduly suppressed by the interest in the problem of truth, but they were never really brought to silence. Their inner life energy makes them heard even where they seem to be unwelcome. Only one ideal has suffered the full severity of the situation; while no one in his fights about truth has dared entirely to forget that there is morality in the world too, American philosophers, with two or three notable exceptions, have not cared to remember that beauty also is interwoven in the life we aim to understand. I claim that, without forgetting that the empirical psychology of the sense of beauty, the experimental analysis and the physiological explanation, have given us some strong contributions to a psychological æsthetics. The psychologist has not to speak the last word here, and nobody would suppose that he has, if we had not so carelessly and so persistently neglected the philosophy of beauty.

Of course, whoever approaches the problem of beauty to-day is inclined to start with the study of the psychological processes in æsthetic enjoyment. Here alone is evidently solid ground. It was the great day of emancipation for æsthetics when at last it became liberated from metaphysical speculation and when Fechner's patience laid the foundation for an æsthetics "from below," for an æsthetics which simply gathers the empirical facts, describes them with scientific exactness, starts with the simplest elements and leads slowly from the most elementary æsthetic experience to the appreciation of the highest treasures of art. It was the hour of birth for experimental æsthetics, which in the last decades has found greater and greater access to the psychological laboratories of all countries. Its spirit harmonized well with the ethnological discoveries of the same period, and with the folk-lore studies which have shown us the primitive origins of human art.

What biology and ethnology and history of art have yielded there, offers evidently no difficulty as far as principles are con-

cerned. It is the same simple story which the last fifty years have told us in every department of human endeavor, the story of slow, natural development. Artistic creation and artistic appreciation have grown as language and religion, as customs and law have grown. More difficulty and therefore more controversy belong to the contributions of the empirical psychologist. Certainly the psychologist's starting-point was very simple and natural too. He had to begin with the question: What are the impressions which we prefer to others? Which colors and which color combinations, which tone successions and which chords, which lines and angles and curves, which rhythms and which movements, are more or less pleasant? The experiment alone can give the answer, if one seeks exactitude. It was short-sighted to claim that such experimental æsthetics would remain unsatisfactory, because it could never lead beyond an analysis of the simplest pleasant stimuli. That was the same narrowness with which, at the cradle of experimental psychology, it was prophesied that the psychological laboratory could never grow beyond the study of sensations and reactions. Meantime the psychological experiment has conquered the whole field of mental life; and in the same way we may not merely have a vague hope, but we may confidently expect that the psychological experiment in æsthetics too will lead from the simple stimulations to the most complex objects of appreciation. Yes, it cannot be denied that much has been reached, and that the strictly experimental method has been applied in recent days to æsthetic material which far exceeds the elementary beginnings, to pictures and poems and melodies.

But more important was the increasing insight into the fact that the character of the outer stimuli is not sufficient to explain the pleasure which their perception offers. From year to year the experimental work has turned more and more to a careful study of the subjective factors. We may think here of the investigations which refer to the psychophysical conditions: how far, for instance, do different positions or fatigue or drugs or repetitions influence our enjoyment? Or we may think of the investigations which refer to the psychophysical effects, for instance, to the

motor responses or to changes in pulse and breathing during the æsthetic state. Or finally we may think of those studies which examine the associations and inhibitions, the memory processes and organic sensations in the æsthetic affection. It cannot be denied that the experimental results along these lines have so far been mèagre. We are only at the beginning of the laboratory task, as far as the subjective factors of the æsthetic state are involved.

Yet the shortcomings of the laboratory work are not harmful, as we can fill the blanks of our knowledge by the results of careful self-observation in our daily enjoyment of works of art. Every artistic experience works here as a kind of experiment. The psychologists have, therefore, not waited until the laboratories have furnished us with exact data: most various psychological theories have clamored for acceptance.

We know the theory which says that the physical stimuli awaken in us a system of motor responses, and that we feel pleasantness whenever these physiological tensions and excitements and movements harmonize with the structural conditions of the organism. On the other hand we have theories which refer to psychical factors only, and seek the source of pleasantness in the similarity and likeness of mental states. We like it that the mental response which one element awakes is in some respects the same as the other elements are producing. Other theories again arise from quite different starting points. That which is really pleasant, they say, is the feeling that the perceived object of art does not make demands on our practical activity, that is, that our impulses to real actions are inhibited. That gives us a pleasant feeling of freedom from the necessities of practical existence. We are in a playful attitude which awakens an agreeable emotion. Quite near to this stands the theory which emphasizes that the work of art inhibits whatever is not contained in it. All associations which carry our mental life away from the æsthetic perception are thus inhibited and suppressed, and this hypnotizing power of the work of art overcomes us with a restful feeling of pleasure; we are liberated from the real chain of events. But if such theories emphasize the feeling of unreality, others

point out how this state of mind alternates with the opposite : it has been insisted, indeed, that the whole pleasant effect of art lies in this constant fluctuation between the feeling of reality and the feeling of unreality, a kind of pendulum movement, which gives us a particular pleasure.

Other theorists again insist that we project our own mental states into the æsthetic object. We enjoy it to be thus free from the feeling of our own personality, to feel, instead of ourselves, the actions of nature. Or, on the contrary, it may be said that our self enjoys itself because it becomes the richer, the more it absorbs the external impulses and energies. Is it necessary to gather still more types of psychological theories, to speak further of those which emphasize the pleasure from associated ideas of practical advantage or of moral satisfaction, or the pleasure of mere imitation, or the pleasure of overcoming technical difficulties, and so on? May we not rather notice that every one of them points to important parts of the experience and that they are in no way contradictory to one another? Yes, perhaps all of them ought to enter as factors into an ultimate psychological theory of the pleasantness of beautiful objects. But more important to me is the fact that they all belong together in still another way : they all, without exception, are nothing but psychological theories.

Their common presupposition is this : the works of art or the beauties of nature are physical objects, lights and sounds and so on in a physical world, and they have a certain causal effect in human organisms, they stimulate the sense organs and the brain and awake there a series of physiological and mental phenomena of which the last is a feeling of pleasantness. The various theories disagree as to the most important links in this causal chain between the sensory stimulation of the brain and the feeling of pleasantness, but the principles and the purposes of the theories are, after all, the same throughout. They are fundamentally not different from the psychological explanation of the enjoyment of fruit and coffee and candy. The psychophysical processes between the sensations in eating an apple and the pleasure we have in the fruit may be simple ; those between the impression of a

painting by Rembrandt and the pleasure in the picture may be complex. But the interposition of all those associations and inhibitions, fusions and impulses does not really change the character of the psychological task : it is an individual pleasure feeling which is to be explained by causal means. The æsthetic enjoyment in every case means a certain pleasant feeling stirred up in the individual organism, and the beauty of the object is nothing but an illusory objectification of this mental phenomenon of pleasure. Things of beauty have themselves no value, they are themselves ultimately physical molecules, mechanical atoms, air-waves, and ether-waves. Their only æsthetic import lies in the fact that they are the causes of pleasant effects in psychophysical individuals.

But have we really a right to stop here and to accept such psychological analysis as the last word of æsthetic inquiry? Has beauty really no further meaning for us than that it gives us a pleasant feeling? Is our enjoyment of Leonardo's Mona Lisa or of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, of Hamlet or of Antigone, really nothing but a more complex pleasure of the kind which chocolate and perfumes may awaken in us. Yes, have I ever been near at all to the altar of beauty, if my personal pleasure, my individual state, my passing enjoyment was all that I meant by the meaning of beauty? If I enjoy the pleasures of life I seek my own comfort, my own tickling sensations, in short, I seek states of myself. If I worship at the shrine of beauty I know that nothing depends upon me, the chance individual, that I reach out there to a reality which must be valuable for every one who is able to feel it, that it comes to me as an ought to which I submit, that it comes as a perfection which belongs to the truest meaning of the world and which cannot be otherwise. I may not be able to hold it, I may not be worthy to enter into its endlessness, but if it ever spoke to me at all and unveiled its beauty, it did not ask me whether there was pleasure in my consciousness, it asked only whether I grasped its harmony and through it the perfection of the world.

The well-trained psychologist has a condescending smile for such metaphysical cant. He shivers at the thought that he

might be thrown back to the speculative æsthetics of pre-psychological times, to that æsthetics 'from above' which begins with vague speculation instead of the facts of real experience. Yet he is not afraid of any danger, because his psychology can quickly give a full account of such mystical moods. Of course, he says, in excitable personalities the psychophysical emotions caused by the pleasant object may overflow into secondary channels and produce semi-religious associations and feelings. The psychologist is perfectly satisfied with this solution of the problem and simply asks us to inhibit those vague associations and to stick to the real facts.

I agree with him fully, but I ask: What are the real facts? What is my real, immediate, unreconstructed life experience? I have before me the drawing of a simple beautiful arabesque. Its halves balance each other, a rhythmical movement pervades their interplay, they move away from the center and come back, and the longer I follow their energies, the more I understand their perfect harmony. What are the facts? You say the drawing is a physical distribution of white and black points; they produce in my mind a visual idea through the agency of my sense organ and my brain, and this idea by associations and reactions awakes a psychical idea of movement and energy which I project into the physical ornament, and from this finally arises in my content of consciousness a feeling of pleasure. All of this I deny: I say that nothing of the kind enters into my experience. In seeing this ornament, I have not the double experience of the physical thing outside of me and the mental visual idea of it in me, enclosed in the capsule of my consciousness; I do not know that ornament as being in me at all, nor do I know of my brain, nor do I feel my feeling as an experience of which I simply become aware, nor do I know of those energies as states in me, nor do I know of any causal connection between those various factors; in short, no one of those so-called facts of physics and psychology present themselves to me as expressions of my real experience. I do not say that they are not true; that means I do not deny that it may have logical value to look at the situation as if it presented itself in those physical and psychological categories

and thus to reshape for certain purposes the facts of life in the way to which physics and psychology are accustomed. I insist only that their truths so cloaked and masked are not the naked facts of life, and that if we really want an æsthetics 'from below,' that is, an æsthetics which begins where no complicated thinking has remolded the facts, then we cannot possibly start from the results of physiological psychology. They may be necessary for certain ends but they are artificial, and to leave them behind and to come back at last to that which we really experience is certainly not a neglect of facts, but a true regaining of facts, from which the causal sciences lead us away not less than the metaphysical speculations. What are the facts? I ask again.

This ornament on paper is to me not two-fold but one, neither a physical thing made up of atoms, nor a visual image made up of sensations. It is a still undifferentiated pre-physical and pre-psychological object. On the other hand, I myself take attitude toward it not as a passive subject of consciousness which becomes aware of feelings and emotions, ideas and volitions, as conscious phenomena, but I myself am living through those attitudes, I am the will which reaches out directly toward those real objects. The antithesis of the subject of will and of the object is primary; it is a far way from it to the quite different antithesis of psychical and physical. Yes, I can go further. That object of my interest is not even a 'thing' in the sense of physical existence. If I speak of my object as a thing, I mean by it more than my immediate impression; I mean then that it will be a possible object for later experience and was an object for previous experience. In short, I have introduced thought relations which lie in the direction of physics, but which transcend the actual fact of my æsthetic experience. Neither the ornament before me, nor the picturesque church tower I see, nor the melody I hear is more than an impression which comes to me as a meaning, as a manifoldness of energies, of suggestions, of demands. I do not ask whether it will lead beyond the present experience, whether it is a thing; the impression stands for itself and every element in it wants me to take part. I feel uplifted with the noble upward movement of the tower, that is, the will of my personality wills

with the tower itself, and with the tones of the melody my will excites itself and longs for the other tones. Let us for once banish the reminiscences of physical knowledge, let us for once face reality as we experience it, naïvely and purely, and every difficulty disappears for understanding the self-expression of this world of objects as a concrete fact. It may be ever so valuable to turn from reality in the other direction and to connect experiences until they give us things and causal connections, but it is certainly not less justified to resist such an impulse, and to seek to understand instead what we hold in the present experience itself, before we transcend it.

In such immediate experience every part comes to me as a suggestion for my will. I grasp it in willing with it. But to live through a will is of course in itself no satisfaction, no joy and no value; yet only one more step is to be taken and we reach beauty. It is a decisive step, the step which gives meaning to our life and allows us to speak of a world at all. It is the act which constitutes the meaning of a world as against a mere dream and a chaos. Impressions come to us, but scattered impressions as such are never a world, and it is our share, it is our eternal share to decide whether we are satisfied with a scattered chaos of impressions or whether ours is a world which asserts its inner independence.

If you decide that your experience is to you nothing but a dream, each impression, each suggestion, nothing but an impression, nothing but a suggestion, without connection, without agreement, without mutual relation, then there is no need of asking whether there is anything valuable in the world, because you have no world. There is no need of thought then, there is no need for discussion, because there is nothing which lasts and nothing which is shared and nothing but a chaos of bits of which no one can reach the other. But if you decide to seek in this chaos a real world, then the constitution of that world is determined by the demand of your own seeking will, because nothing else can constitute that world but what you intend to understand as belonging to such a world. Vice versa, whatever your will requires as necessary to constitute a world is then

acknowledged beforehand as a feature of the world which you are seeking. It belongs to the world and cannot be eliminated from it, however far you may be from having reached it. It is eternally bound up with the world, as long as the will is posited to affirm such a world at all and to transcend the chaos of dream-like impressions.

Those absolute properties of the world are then for us no longer mere experiences, but they are the fulfilments of our own will to have a world, and every fulfilment of a will is a satisfaction. As this will to have a world is the one condition of the world which cannot be eliminated, therefore everything which constitutes the world as such offers an absolute satisfaction for every possible subject. Such satisfaction does not indeed depend upon the individual desire of the one or the other, does not depend upon the chance situation of personalities, and is thus no satisfaction of a merely personal desire: in short, it is an over-personal enjoyment and thus an absolute value. The will for the pleasant object is different with every personality and with every experience. The will for a world which is more than a dream is the presupposition for everyone whom we acknowledge at all as a subject. Whoever denies the decision in favor of a world has no longer any relation to our inquiry as to the constitution of this world; whoever makes that decision, performs the step which leads from the chaos of experience to eternal values.

Here we ask for one value of the world only, for that of beauty. We said the bits of experience come to us as suggestions for our will. Every color and every tone, every angle and every curve, every rhythm and every word has an expression which we understand. If we now transcend these single suggestions with the aim to find a world, then our first demand must be that such expression does not remain a chance experience without support and agreement. Our will to get a glimpse of a world is satisfied as soon as we discover that the one will which speaks to us finds an equal in another will, that the one demand is satisfied by the agreement of another demand, that the purpose of the one line coincides with the purpose of the other line, that the desire of the one tone is harmonizing with the aim of the other tone,

that the striving of one word is welcomed by the desire of the other. It is a long way from the mutual sympathy of a few tones in a simple melody and of a few lines in a simple ornament to the complete harmony and unity of life and world, but it is a straight way without turning of the road. Wherever a manifoldness of will is experienced, there every agreement of the various parts is the fulfilment of our demand for a non-chaotic, for a self-agreeing world, and thus satisfactory for every possible subject which wills a world, and thus eternally valuable.

This value is then independent of the question whether this self-agreeing experience satisfies at the same time still other demands of merely personal character, and gives thus pleasure or relief from displeasure. The beautiful may be pleasant and agreeable but it is never beautiful because it is agreeable. It is beautiful because it is perfect, because every demand which is raised in its manifoldness is completely satisfied by the will of the other parts. The objective satisfaction resulting from the will to have such a perfect self-agreeing world is the only æsthetic attitude ; the subjective satisfaction resulting from the chance desires of the personality is the practical attitude which may change with every man and with every hour and which lies below the level of æsthetics. The absolute value of the beautiful as belonging to the eternal structure of the only possible world is thus also entirely independent from the empirical fact whether particular individuals are able to take this æsthetic attitude and are thus able to understand the beauty of the world. It may be that the will of the object does not reach their will, that they deal with the object merely as material for the fulfilment of their practical desires. Their individual inability cannot possibly interfere with the entirely different question as to the objective value of that which they do not understand. Whether the unmusical person finds that music is to him an agreeable noise or a disagreeable noise has no bearing on the beauty of music. He knows no music at all, but only sounds, and the pleasure or displeasure which these sounds stir up in him by organic sensations or associations is a by-product which has no internal relation to the striving of the great composers. Our life involves a manifoldness

of attitudes towards the world. If we are to have a world at all, it must be ultimately the same world for all of us, but the world character of the experience can be reached in many ways. The æsthetic approach is only one. You may reach the world by merely ethical or logical attitudes, and a life may find its unity without taking an æsthetic attitude towards experience at all; that surely does not interfere with the absolute value of the æsthetic completeness.

I have said that the absence of æsthetic attitude does perhaps not necessarily mar that unity of life which we all are seeking, but is not this unity of life itself such an ideal of completeness and harmony, and therefore ultimately an æsthetic value? If we seek principles, we have indeed no right to overlook the fact that the æsthetic attitude is not at all confined to works of art, and that the artistic efforts of historic civilization only bring to a focus the same energies and attitudes with which we meet the world in its natural flow. It would be a mere quarreling about words if we were unwilling to speak about beauty where the experience has not been reshaped by the genius of the artist. Are we not accustomed to speak of the beauty of the sunset and of our æsthetic attitude towards the ocean? We have no right to avoid the word when the same conditions are fulfilled in other spheres of experience. I do not hesitate to claim that friendship and love and peace in mankind are æsthetic values, yes that the unity of ourselves, that every inner completeness, that every happiness has its true meaning in its æsthetic perfection.

Indeed for a moment let us abstract ourselves from that systematic heightening of the world completeness by the means of art, and let us evaluate the immediate beauty of life. There are three spheres of experience for everyone. There is a world of outer objects, there is a world of other subjects, there is a world of the own inner personality. The scientist would like to substitute for those outer impressions the physical things and for the inner purposes he would substitute the psychological phenomena: we know that both lead us away from immediate reality. But still more are we removed from real life when science makes us believe that those other personalities come to us as physical objects, as

organisms, into which we introject mental phenomena by analogy with our introspection. In the life experience from which we start, other people come to us as subjects of will, as personalities with whom we agree or disagree, whose attitudes we understand and who are not at all in question as objects. If thus our original experience is restituted and freed from the reminiscences of a remodelling physics and psychology, then the world becomes for us a world of suggestions through outer impressions, a world of demands through other personalities, a world of purposes in our inner life. Every one of these three groups may show us inner agreement and unity.

If the purposes of the outer impressions harmonize, we have the æsthetic value of natural beauty; if the will of the various personalities harmonizes, we have the æsthetic value of love in all its shadings; if the totality of our inner demands is in harmony, we have the æsthetic value of happiness. Now we easily see why beauty of nature is to us a rare experience. It is possible only when nature suggests to us its own will and thus makes us feel with her desires and intentions, with her excitements and rhythms; and that again can be realized only when those outer impressions do not come in question for us as starting points for action and as material for the satisfaction of our personal demands. If we fight with the waves of the ocean, they are to us only a dangerous object; they have no meaning to us because our personal interest demands from us that we treat those impressions in their causal connectiveness and thus as non-living physical objects. But if we stand on the safe rock, each wave and the foam of the surf suggests to us impulse and energy and we feel the perfect symphony and the mutual agreement of the acts of the excited ocean. It is not an abstract idea which nature tells us and still less a moral, it is nothing which stands mystically behind nature; that which is expressed is the energy and the strength and the impulse, the excitement of the colors and of the lines and of the rhythms and of the sounds. Whether any such element of nature is comforting to ourselves or painful, is agreeably tickling or disagreeable, does not influence the beauty of nature. Beauty demands only that we feel ourselves into the

will of nature and that we find a fulfilment of each desire in the agreement which the other parts of nature offer. Or course, the richer the manifoldness of such will, the more intense the beauty of the landscape.

It is not otherwise when we understand the mutual agreement of a human manifold. If two personalities agree in friendship or millions of wills are harmonized in peace, it is not at all the question whether such will satisfies our own personal desires ; no, the value lies here again entirely in the fact that two are agreeing and that the chaotic state of experience has thus been organized into that unity of will which means the world. Wherever two wills are felt by us as one, there something absolutely valuable speaks to us and its harmony has entered into the eternal meaning of the world. Love and harmony of souls, devotion and peace, are misplaced in the system of values if they are classified, as they usually are, among the ethical virtues. That two souls unite in love and that their will becomes one, without struggle and without resistance, following the deepest impulse of their will, cannot have any moral value. It has no right to claim ethical praise ; but it is endlessly beautiful and the world is eternally richer by such perfect harmony of personalities.

But still more is this misplacement habitual with the æsthetic value of happiness. Utilitarian ethics, using vaguely the word happiness for mere pleasure, has always tried to smuggle happiness into the system of morality. Idealistic ethics separated morality from happiness and believed therefore that it had to remove happiness entirely from the world of absolute values. Certainly happiness lies outside of the field of ethics, but an absolute value it is. It is the æsthetic completeness and harmony of our own strivings. Just for that reason it is endlessly more than, or rather something entirely different from, mere pleasure. The pleasure which satisfies my particular desire extinguishes the will. There is no longer any will when it is satisfied. True happiness wants the full richness of continuous striving, and yet the full agreement of all inner energies. There may be no value in any one of these particular desires, but their complete mutual harmony constitutes our inner life as an absolute æsthetic value.

The offerings of the outer world will thus the more enter into this happiness, the more they become themselves starting points for new and ever new demands and endeavors. Nature and the inner life of mankind offer us incessant gifts of beauty through their external harmony, through love and through happiness, and there is no human life into which never a ray of this perfection of the world penetrates.

The history of civilization is the great human effort to realize systematically and to bring to consciousness the absolute values of the world. Science and religion, law and economics, each is serving that task for different groups of eternal values. It has been the function of art to strive systematically towards the realization of æsthetic values. The fine arts do it with reference to the outer world, the literary arts with reference to the relations of personalities, music with relation to the inner world; thus we have the same three groups which we found in immediate life experience. The purpose of the visible arts is indeed to give us a piece of the outer world in such a way that we completely understand the mutual agreement of all the intentions in this given manifoldness, and feel thus in this single piece the eternal perfection of the universe. Every possible rule and principle of art can be deduced from a clear understanding of this ultimate aim of the artist. One demand stands in the foreground. To find an inner agreement in the outer world it must come to us as will, because only intentions can agree. Thus it must cease to be simply material for our practical work, simply object for our interest. It must therefore be cut off from the chain of practical events, it must not be the effect of previous or the cause of later happenings, it must be disconnected from the remainder of the world; in short, it must be entirely isolated. The isolated alone eliminates every connection, and thus every practical attitude, and this isolation is reached by art. In the painted landscape there are no people behind the mountains, and the road does not lead beyond the frame; the lion of marble cannot spring upon us; the dying heroine on the stage does not expect that we rush to her help; the persons of the novel will never interfere with our daily life. Art gives us isolation, and just for that reason our demand

for complete agreement in that experience can be satisfied. Whether it will be satisfied completely depends upon the question whether we have a perfect work of art, whether a genius moulded the experience.

This isolation alone constitutes the unreality of art. Of course, the bronze statue fills a real space just as much as a living man, and the Hamlet on the stage is even a real living man himself. It would also be misleading to say that the painting is unreal because it is not itself the real landscape but only a representation of reality; and that the novel is not itself the real love affair but only its report. No, the illustration of a natural history book or the historical biography are in the same way representations only, and yet they are not at all in question as unreal. That which is meant is rather this. To be unreal in the æsthetical sense means that the object of this experience does not transcend itself, does not awake any expectations for future changes or any reminiscences of previous stages. The waves in the painted ocean are not expected ever to move; the hero in the marble monument is not expected ever to speak. No artistic experience points away from itself. It can never be grasped in a later stage and was never known in a previous one, and lacks by that all those characteristics which constitute the physical existence and in this sense the reality.

In order to suppress in this way every expectation of practical connection many means are possible. The painter gives us nature in the richness of its colors but eliminates the third dimension. The two-dimensional landscape suggests to us still every impulse which its colors and forms and contents, its trees and meadows and people may express, but the wanderer on that meadow will never advance on his way. The expectation that he may advance is not destroyed because the painter was unable to reproduce the landscape in its plastic form, but the painter projected his landscape into the plane because he wanted to eliminate the expectation that the wanderer ever may advance. The sculptor keeps that third dimension but he eliminates the color; the colored wax figure which deceives us and thus stimulates the expectation of movements, stands on a level far below

real art. In the same way the poet uses rhythm and rhyme to exclude the expectation that his verses should be taken as reports of occurrences and of moods which enter into the chain of actions. Not otherwise the life on the stage. Its frame cuts off every expectation that those persons with their ambitions and their intrigues may have an existence beyond that which they show to us.

This unreality of the artistic object detracts nothing from the richness of the experience. That which is superadded in the real object is only its pointing beyond itself. The unreal offering of art has thus never to deceive us with the illusion of reality, as such illusion would eliminate the æsthetic attitude. But such absence of reality does in no way put the unreal object on a lower level than the real object, as if something were lacking. The unreal is something entirely different but not at all less valuable than the real. The usual predominance of our practical life interests may mislead us and may make us feel as if the real is positive and the unreal something negative, as if the unreal would become more valuable if reality might still be added. But with the same logical right, we might reverse the relation. The unreal is that which offers itself in its entirety, which is complete in itself and which thus needs no reference to anything beyond itself. The real, on the other hand, has its meaning in the expectation which it awakens and in the connections which lead beyond its own limits. The experience of the real is therefore that which in itself is incomplete, in itself imperfect, in itself unsatisfactory. The real is then the negative and that which lives in art becomes the positive. The real in its incompleteness strives to reach by its development and changes and connection that self-perfection which belongs at once to the creation of the artistic genius. It is a one-sidedness in our view of the world if we usually presuppose that the reality character of the world is fundamental and the perfection character a rather accidental addition. With the same one-sided over-valuation, we might consider that which is united in itself, harmonizing and complete in itself and therefore beautiful, as the only true and valuable world; it would then be an accidental side-fact that there are

some experiences which have no perfection, but stir up expectations of connection and have therefore scientific existence, and thus gain a certain value by their objective reality.

If the visible arts bring out the inner harmony in the manifoldness of nature, the literary arts deal with the will of man; and as man's life has that threefold relation to the outer world, to the other men and to his own personality, we have three fundamental forms of literature. The epic narrates the hero's strivings in the outer world, the drama represents his relation to his fellowmen, and lyrics give expression to that experience of man which is bound up with his inner life. But in all three cases the poet gives us a manifoldness of excitements and intentions and purposes which is in complete agreement. Every sound of every vowel and every consonant, every rhythm and every line, every syllable and every word, every metaphor and every thought has there its own intention which resounds in us, its own will which we feel with it, and if they are all in harmony, the poem is perfect. Of course, that does not mean that literature deals only with men who stand in harmonious friendly relations with one another. On the contrary, the sharp conflict of antagonistic will belongs to the deepest meaning of the drama, and yet it has been said rightly that the true tragedy leaves no disharmony. That is the necessary difference between art and life; the conflict of personalities on the battlefield of life is disharmonious because all the practical connections are working, no unity is reached in such hostility. But the drama has cut off those relations, the manifoldness which it offers is isolated through the frame of the stage, and in this limited manifoldness every single will serves perfectly the intention of the whole. The tragic conflict which wants to express itself demands the will of both the hero and his enemy. The will of the one has no meaning without the antagonistic will of the other. If we want the one we need the other, and thus they are all in perfect agreement, bound together in one unity. It is the same as in the fine arts; the painter may create a perfect painting of complete beauty of which the content is the ugliest beggar. That which is ugly and disharmonious in nature and life may be the content of the most beautiful creation of art. As

soon as the expression of this dirty beggar is recognized as the purport of the offering complete harmony is reached, if every line and every color every movement of the figure and every suggestion of the background agrees in bringing out this aim The unreal content can thus reach complete unity of experience where the same manifoldness felt as reality would be disharmonious and repulsive.

The harmony of our inner movements, which in the reality of life comes to us in moments of complete happiness, is reached in art by the experience of music. The tones do not describe and. do not depict anything. They only liberate our own self which may live itself out in the movements and rhythms, in the longings and fulfilments of the tones. To bring to us such rich inner emotion, we need the tone-material just because those tones are not things; they have no practical value in the world, and while they come from instruments our attitudes do not refer to those external objects. Pictures and words speak to us of nature and other men, tones do not speak of anything. Their meaning is just their mutual relation which we feel and which thus fills our mind with an endless inner movement, with a striving and reaching, and yet all in that inner harmony of intentions which is the happiness of perfection. In music alone, in the completion of the simplest melody, in the unity of the simplest chord, complete repose is brought to us, and yet a repose not by lack of will, but by the complete equilibrium of over-rich inner excitement. Music thus expresses the harmony of ourselves, as poetry unveils the harmony of mankind, and fine art the harmony of nature. Yet this inner self is isolated again and cut loose from the practical emotions which may rush to our mind, because music substitutes the unreal world of tones for the real world of things.

Thus art demands many factors. The manifoldness of the content must be unreal; it must express a will; this will must be important; this will must be felt by us; our own will must be extinguished; every relation to anything beyond the content must be cut off; the whole must be entirely isolated; it must have its own form; this form must harmonize with the content;

all the suggestions of the parts of form and content must agree with the aim of the whole. But all these factors are not found there together by chance; they are all controlled by the one fundamental aim of art, that the internal agreement of the experienced manifold shall come to expression. Only because we seek agreement, we must understand it as will; only to understand the will of the experience, we must eliminate our own personal will; to eliminate our personal will, the experience must be cut off from the world and be isolated and thus unreal: if this isolated will-manifold is in perfect unity, we have a work of beauty. This unity of will, on the other hand, represents an absolute value, as we have recognized from the start. If the will which comes to us as a suggestion is to be more than a chance flash, is to be the expression of something self-dependent and self-existing, in short, of a world, it must agree in itself, and only as far as it agrees with itself has it a meaning which is more than a chaotic dream. We want to reach in our experience such a self-asserting world, or else every discussion about the world is by principle meaningless. We receive, therefore, the single experience with a demand for an identical intention in the other parts of the given manifold, and when the identity is found, we are satisfied. But as this satisfaction refers entirely to the impersonal demand for a world, a demand which necessarily belongs to every subject as a subject, this satisfaction is over-personal; the identity of will in the factors which constitute a work of art is thus valuable in an over-personal sense; it is an absolute value. As such it is entirely independent from the other question whether the whole artistic work or parts of it satisfy at the same time a personal demand for pleasant feelings and agreeable advantages. The work of art may be pleasant but it *ought* to be beautiful. That the world demonstrates its self-assertion through the inner harmony of its will expressions, is a demand which constitutes the meaning of every possible subject that seeks a world. The satisfaction of this demand must thus be a general and necessary value; there cannot be a subject which does not acknowledge this value; there cannot be a world without this value. Our personal pleasures vary and may pass by; the value of beauty is eternal.

From this highest point, we easily see the fundamental difference between æsthetic and logical value. They lie in opposite directions and yet the ultimate principle is the same. The satisfaction of the logical demand is another fulfilment of the same postulate. The subject wants to transcend the chaotic flashes of experience. From the chaos he reaches out for a world which asserts itself. In beauty we found it by the mutual agreement of the parts of a manifold. But this same self-assertion of the world can be reached in an opposite way: if we do not consider the manifold and the identity of the aims in its parts but if we consider the single experience and seek its identity in new and ever new situations of life. That alone is the logical attitude. In immediate life experience, we reach by such logical act at once the values of practical existence, of objective reality. We hold the single experience of the outer world and seek now its identity in the experiences of other subjects or in new experience of our own. The impression is thus constitutive of a physical thing. Or we meet a suggestion and we understand the will which expresses itself there as identical with a will in other experiences, and we constitute by it the existence of a personality. Or we meet in ourselves an experience of will and again we find it not fleeting but recognize it as identical in every new experience, and we then constitute it as a really existing norm. Things, persons, and norms are thus experiences to which we give the value of objective existence. But this again is an absolute value because it is again the satisfaction of the over-personal demand that the single momentary flash of experience remain identical with itself and that thus a world is with us.

Just as the æsthetic attitude was leading from natural beauty and love and happiness to those artificial creations of civilization in our art, in the same way the logical attitude leads from the mere, immediate values of existence and reality to the systematic efforts of civilization which we call science. Yet the logical attitude remains the same. Knowledge is a systematic reconstruction by which every thing and every person and every norm is understood as remaining identical with itself throughout every possible experience. For that purpose the things are linked into

a chain of causal events which make up the physical universe, the personalities are embedded in history, the norms are set into logical systems. Whether we deal with physics or with history or with mathematics, it is an endless remolding of experience until everything is transformed into a system of identities, until the universe is made up of indestructible atoms which remain identical with themselves or energies which cannot disappear. Science must thus connect these experiences until everything is a part of the systematic whole in which it can assert itself as identical with itself, while art isolates the experiences and cuts off all the relations of the one given manifold from the remainder of the world.

The æsthetical value of beautiful unity and the logical value of connected existence are thus equally fulfilments of the over-personal, absolute demand for the self-realization of a world in this chaotic experience. Our insight into such connections makes us, of course, able to calculate from that which is given that which is not yet experienced, that which is to be expected, that which thus becomes important for the practical deed. Our appreciation of beauty never leads beyond the given manifold, and is, therefore, useless for practical purposes, but it teaches us to understand the inner meaning of the world. As our knowledge thus offers us the vehicles for practical success, we subordinate ourselves to science and through our subordination we master the world. Beauty we serve by devotion, but in surrendering ourselves to it, we overcome the world and liberate ourselves from its struggles and griefs; for the service of beauty demands that we feel with the will of nature and inhibit the chance will of our own. Through our service to knowledge, we grasp the self-assertion of the world by the everlasting identity of each single element; in the service to beauty, we grasp the self-assertion of the world in the identity of purposes in a given manifold. The real value lies in both cases in this recognition of the identity, in this fulfilment of the demand for a more than flash-like experience, in the grasping of a world through a chaos.

The self-agreement of the world in real beauty does not contradict the fact that its whole or its parts may satisfy also individ-

ual desires, may tickle our senses, may give us a pleasant feeling of play, may carry agreeable memories; the beautiful is then at the same time pleasant. The same relation holds for the logical values; also their real meaning lies in that fulfilment of the absolute postulate for a self-identical world; and their value is thus over-personal and absolute. But the fact that the discovered connections which lead from the present experience to new ones must help us for the calculation of the future and thus for particular achievements, gives to knowledge, too, a pleasant individual effect. The individual demand for personal advantage can be satisfied. The absolute logical value may thus be coupled with a relative value of practical advantageousness just as the absolute æsthetic value is coupled with the relative value of agreeableness. But as the pleasant tickling of our senses does never constitute the real meaning of beauty, so the pleasant experience of advantage does never constitute the real value of truth.

It would lead us too far to ask in what other ways the postulate for a world which asserts itself, and is thus in unity with itself, may be fulfilled. We should then have to turn first of all to the identity between intention and action. We should there easily see that every progress in the universe and every moral self-realization involve just this fundamental harmony. Yes, we might see that nothing else is the ultimate meaning of law and technical civilization. And finally we should recognize that the world is after all not a self-asserting reality, if the demand for identity has led to such different worlds as the world of inner agreement in beauty, the world of systematic connection in truth, the world of self-realization in morality. They all demand absolute value without being united among one another. And therefore the postulate for a world involves a last value by which all these valuable worlds themselves are recognized as agreeing and ultimately identical. This last over-personal demand is fulfilled by the belief in a transcendent will through which the world of æsthetic happiness, of logical existence, and of moral striving are recognized as one; then we have religion. And if this ultimate self-identity is recognized by going not beyond experience, but by grasping that ultimate act through which the

over-personal will in us posits at all the absoluteness of beauty, truth and morality, we have philosophy.

Indeed, only if we take this last step, is philosophy in question. To recognize beauty and truth and morality and religion in their eternal meaning as the deeds of our over-personal will is a true philosophic endeavor. To deal with the pleasant feelings which beauty awakens is nothing but a psychological research, world-far from philosophy. And just where this psychological inquiry into the pleasantness of beauty has its place, there belongs also the much favored study of the advantageous effects which truth may have for us, or the inquiry into the usefulness which moral actions may have, or into the comfort which the consolations of religion may carry to the individual mind. They are all psychology, untouched by the philosophical problem.

To say that such endeavors are psychological and move in a sphere where nothing can be gained for philosophy certainly does not imply that they are not highly important. To examine the individual and social, physiological and psychological effects of beautiful creations, of truthful propositions, or moral self-denial, and of religious inspiration is certainly a large part of scientific knowledge, and everybody will accept the results as long as such questions are not confused with the entirely different problem of what beauty and truth and morality and religion mean, and in what their value consists. Those psychological questions must, of course, be answered by the means of empirical science; biology, psychology, and sociology have to contribute. In the spirit of these memorial days in which our association gladly takes part in celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the *Origin of Species*, I point to the wide perspectives which have been opened by the genius of Darwin. The importance which belongs to the evolution of the æsthetic excitement cannot be overestimated. In the moral field, those social groups must survive which are held together by strong altruistic feelings or which are strengthened in their struggle for existence by intense religious belief. Above all in the logical field, we see clearly that those individuals must survive whose brains produce ideas which can be used for advantageous actions. The survival of the useful ideas is one of the

most immediate consequences of Darwinism in physiological psychology. And from there it is only one step to the interesting and stimulating studies in social psychology which are called pragmatism.

But all these valuable studies are parts of knowledge and thus have themselves a meaning only in reference to the ideal of truth, to the ideal of remolding the chaos into a system of self-asserting identities. That fundamental, over-personal, world-positing act which gives value to truth precedes thus the acknowledgment of every particular group of truths. In our search for absolute truth we construct science and in the midst of science for certain logical purposes we must choose a standpoint from which every human function, even truth-seeking, appears as a psychological phenomenon, and thus individual and relative. From such a standpoint everything absolute must impress us as unreal, inconsistent and grotesque. The absolute is then a kind of monstrous world-lump behind the clouds. To fight against such a conception of the absolute is an effort in which pragmatism is certainly on the right side, but it is an effort which ought to appear superfluous in any philosophy after Kant. Pragmatism in logic and in æsthetics alike, if taken as philosophy, not as psychology, is the latest pre-Kantian answer to a pre-Kantian problem. The absolute which idealism is seeking in beauty as in truth is not a ready-made world behind experience ; it is a rule, it is a law, it is a norm, which binds our will if we are to have a world at all and the realization of which belongs thus to the eternal structure of our experience, if it is to become a world.

Let us do honor to Darwin, last century's leader in the study of scientific facts, and let us in his spirit acknowledge that every physical and psychical thing in the world, biological species and psychological truths, have their origin and their development and their ending ; and thus their merely relative value. But let us philosophers not forget that the same century gave us Fichte's idealism. There is no conflict between these two views which are equally consistent in themselves. To be sure, if we raise the natural science of body or of mind to the dignity of a last philosophy, then we can never reach an absolute value, and a conflict

must arise. But if we recognize that science itself depends upon an absolute deed and an absolute value, then all conflict disappears. Idealism can embrace scientific truth in its totality without disturbing it ; yes, idealism alone can secure to it freedom and safety. The value of the pragmatic doctrine of relative truths and beauties is dependent upon the absolute value of beauty and truth. Darwinism and pragmatism and every relativism can and must enter into absolute idealism : the origin of species and the eternity of values belong together.

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